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Abstract
Both providers and consumers of distributed storage services benefit from the quan-
tification of the severity of consistency violations. However, existing methods fail to
capture a typical pattern of violation - the disorder among operations with reference
to the ideally strong sequential execution. Such disorder is often seen in Internet ap-
plications based on distributed storage services, such as instant messaging. To this
end, we use inversions in a permutation with reference to the ideally strong sequential
execution to measure the consistency of data. The i-atomicity model is defined and a
(pseudo-)polynomial verification algorithm for a restricted type of histories is proposed.
The basic idea of the verification algorithm is brute-force search for the permutation
with less than i inversions, which requires exponential cost. Reasonable assumptions
abstracted from application scenarios can be leveraged to prune the search space, which
yields an efficient polynomial verification algorithm.
1 Introduction
Distributed storage systems have become commercially popular and enable a variety of Internet
services today [5, 7, 6, 2]. Such systems are expected to be fast, always available, highly scalable,
and partition-tolerant. To this end, they typically offer simple key-value operations, and replicate
data across machines or even data-centers, at the expense of introducing data inconsistency [4, 3].
Consistency is a system quality which requires a level of concern comparable to performance
and availability, e.g., in the CAP principle [4] and in the BASE semantics [8]. Though practitioners
widely use the notion of eventual consistency, this is a rather fuzzy consistency term and covers a
broad range of actual consistency behaviors [3]. Both providers and consumers of the distributed
storage service benefit from knowing the precise degree of data (in)consistency.
On the one hand, the service providers need to know what degree of consistency is actually pro-
vided to the consumers and how much burden it requires to develop upper layer applications. Then
they can find room for improvements, possibly without compromising performance or availability.
On the other hand, when the service consumers know better the degree of data inconsistency, the
handling of data update conflicts may be significantly simplified. Measurement of data consistency
enables both parties to better negotiate the service level agreement, and monetary compensations
proportional to the measurement can be supported [11].
Existing techniques for data consistency measurement, mainly time-based [11, 12] and version-
based [10, 13], fail to capture one type of anomaly often seen in Internet services, such as instant
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messaging [20]. In instant messaging scenarios, one salient type of anomaly is the disorder among
messages. While most messages can be delivered in time, often some messages may be out of order
and possibly are reordered after delivery, especially in multi-party and multi-device scenarios 1.
To cope with this problem, we employ the notion of inversion to quantify the severity of
consistency violation. Specifically, an inversion indicates the disorder between two elements with
reference to a given total oder [16]. It is used to define the consistency model we call i-atomicity.
When an execution is said to be i-atomic, it principally means that operations in the execution can
be arranged in a permutation, and no more than i inversions are incurred with reference to the total
order required by atomicity. Here, atomicity is an ideally strong consistency condition, requiring
the execution to be equivalent to a legal sequential execution [17, 14]. In the i-atomicity model,
the severity of consistency violation is defined as the extent to which operations are out-of-order.
The disorder is measured by the number of inversions incurred.
The definition i-atomicity naturally raises the i-AV problem, i.e. verifying whether a given
history of executions (log of shared register accesses) satisfies i-atomicity. The i-AV problem is
NP-Complete in the general case assuming that i is part of the input, since it generalizes the
atomicity verification problem [9]. We propose a pseudo-polynomial algorithm for a restricted type
of histories. Our verification algorithm enumerates all possible permutations based on a structure
we call the configuration graph (CG). The i-AV problem is solved by the traversal of CG at
exponential cost. Reasonable assumptions abstracted from practical scenarios can be leveraged to
prune the CG, leading to efficient traversal in polynomial time.
The rest of this work is organized as follows. Section 2 overviews the existing work. Section
3 and 4 present the i-atomicity model and the verification algorithm. Finally, Section 5 concludes
the paper with a summary and discussions on the future work.
2 Related work
Distributed storage systems emphasize the paramount importance of high availability and resilience
to failures [7, 6]. Thus eventual consistency is often adopted [3]. The notion of eventual consistency
is promoted by practitioners. It is different from the rigorous and formal treatment of consistency
models in the academia [18].
The fuzzy nature of eventual consistency and its wide adoption motivate the quantification of
severity of consistency violations [11, 10, 12, 13]. Existing quantification techniques can be viewed
from two perspectives. From the micro-perspective, time-based quantification techniques, e.g. ∆-
atomicity [11] and Γ-atomicity [12], are adopted for applications sensitive to realtime consistency
requirements. Time-based techniques measure data consistency by how many time units the value
returned has been stale. For applications sensitive to the frequency of data updates, version-
based quantification techniques , e.g. k-atomicity [1, 13], are proposed. Version-based techniques
measure data consistency by how many times the data has been updated when the returned value
is obtained. From the macro-perspective, Yu and Vahdat propose TACT (Tunable Availability
and Consistency Tradeoffs), a middleware layer that supports application-dependent consistency
semantics expressed as a vector of metrics defined over a logical consistency unit or conit [19].
Inconsistencies in the observed value of a conit are bounded using three metrics: numerical error,
order error, and staleness.
The notion of i-atomicity proposed in this work is inspired by the k-atomicity model and the
order error in the TACT framework. However, existing metrics for consistency measurement cannot
1In multi-party scenarios, the conversation usually involves at least three people, while in multi-device scenarios,
the same account may log in on multiple devices e.g., PCs, laptops, pads and mobile phones.
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delineate the disorder among operations. The order error in TACT is defined as the weighted out-
of-order writes that affect a conit. The i-atomicity model puts emphasis on the permutation of all
operations as a whole, which naturally extends the definition of atomicity.
Both k-AV and i-AV are NP-Complete in the general case, since they include the verification
of atomicity as its special case. Read-mapping is used to circumvent the NP-Completeness of
atomicity verification [9]. Assuming read-mapping, the k = 2 case for k-AV is solved in [12]. For
k ≥ 3, the k-AV problem is solved only for special cases. Similarly, we also assume the existence of
read-mapping, and solve the i-AV problem for a restricted type of histories. For fixed k and i, the
problem of proving NP-Completeness for k-AV and i-AV for are principally open.
3 Inversion-based Measurement of Data Consistency
3.1 Preliminaries
We model a distributed key-value store as a collection of read/write registers, replicated over
multiple servers, as in [13]. We define an execution history (or history for short) as a sequence of
events where each event is either the invocation or the response of an operation on a read/write
register. Each operation in the history has both an invocation and a response event. The total
number of operations and the number of writes in the input history are denoted by n and nw,
respectively. As for shared objects that appear in the history, we assume that:
Assumption 1 (Single shared object). All operations in the history are applied to the same object.
Note that Assumption 1 is restrictive. See further discussions on the locality of i-atomicity in
Section 5.
Each event in the history is tagged with a unique time, and events appear in the history in
increasing order of their timestamps. Given a read r and a write w, we call w a dictating write of
r if r and w share the same value. In that case we call r a dictated read of w. A write may have
any number of dictated reads, but for the number of dictating write we assume that:
Assumption 2 (Read-mapping). Every read operation is mapped to its unique dictating write.
For history σ, we can define the partial order between operations. Let o.s and o.f denote the
timestamps of the invocation and the response events of operation o respectively, and define o1 → o2
if o1.f < o2.s. We define o1||o2 if neither o1 → o2 nor o2 → o1 holds. For the ease of presentation,
we assume that:
Assumption 3 (Read after write). If r is a read operation and w is its dictating write, then r 6→ w
(i.e., w → r or w||r).
Histories not satisfying Assumption 3 are considered buggy and will not be considered for consis-
tency measurement.
For any history σ, since all writes are unique, we can naturally group the operations into clusters:
Definition 1 (Cluster). A cluster ci(1 ≤ i ≤ nw) consists of one unique write operation and all its
dictated reads.
Obviously, the number of clusters is also nw. We assume that the clusters are totally ordered by the
start time of the dictating writes, which can be achieved by pre-processing the history in O(n log n)
time.
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3.2 The i-atomicity model and the i-AV problem
The basic idea of the i-atomicity model is that, when all operations in a history are put into a legal
permutation and less than i inversions are incurred, the history is considered i-atomic. To give the
precise definition, we first define the key notion of an inversion. Let pi denote one permutation of
all operations in a history σ, and let pi(i) denotes the ith operation in pi. For any permutation pi,
we can decide whether any pair of operations form an inversion with reference to σ 2:
Bpi(i, j) =
{
1 if i < j, but pi(j)→ pi(i) in σ
0 otherwise
Given Bpi(i, j) for any pair of i and j, we can count the maximum number of inversions incurred
by one operation in σ:
Imax(pi) = max
1≤i≤n
 ∑
1≤j<i
Bpi(j, i) +
∑
i<k≤n
Bpi(i, k)

After defining what an inversion is and how to calculate the number of inversions of our concern,
we can further define i-atomicity and i-AV:
Definition 2 (i-atomicity). For integer i ≥ 0, the history σ is defined to be i-atomic, if there exists
some permutation pi of all operations in σ such that:
• The permutation pi is legal, i.e. every read operation reads the value of its latest preceding
write in pi.
• The history σ is not too out-of-order with reference to the legal pi, i.e. Imax(pi) ≤ i.
The i-atomicity model is obviously a generalization of atomicity [17, 14]. When i = 0, i-atomicity
transforms to atomicity.
The definition of i-atomicity naturally defines the i-AV problem:
Definition 3 (i-AV).
• INSTANCE: One history σ; integer i ≥ 0.
• QUESTION: Is σ i-atomic?
For the i-atomicity model to be useful in practical scenarios, we need to explore efficient algorithms
for the i-AV problem. One such an attempt is presented in the following Section 4.
4 An efficient i-AV algorithm for a restricted class of histories
To verify whether history σ is i-atomic, we need to find a certificate, i.e. a permutation with no
more than i inversions. Our search for the certificate is basically brute-force enumeration. The
search is facilitated by a structure we call the Configuration Graph (CG), inspired by [13]. More
importantly, pruning of CG leveraging reasonable assumptions from practical scenarios can reduce
the search cost from exponential to polynomial time. We first outline the brute-force enumeration
process. Then we define the CG. Finally, we propose the pruning and the cost analysis.
2The history σ is omitted when it is obvious from the context.
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4.1 Configurations during the search for the certificate
The clusters are sorted according to the start time of the dictating writes, and are named c1, c2, · · · , cnw
accordingly. To search for the certificate, we scan the (sorted) clusters one by one and the pointer
idx (1 ≤ idx ≤ nw + 1) slides to the cluster currently being processed. The special index nw + 1 is
used to indicate the end of the scan. The certificate is constructed by appending all clusters one
by one to the prefix pipre of the final permutation. The current cluster cidx can be decided, i.e.,
appended to pipre, or buffered and decide its position in pipre later. The Cbuf is the (sorted) set of
buffered clusters.
According to the state transformation described above, we color the clusters, which is analogous
to the coloring used in standard graph traversals:
• WHITE: The clusters which have not been processed yet are colored WHITE.
• BLACK: When the cluster has been appended to pipre, it is colored BLACK. Its position in
the certificate has been decided and will no longer change.
• GRAY: When the cluster has been processed, but has not been appended to pipre, it is colored
GRAY. For a GRAY cluster, it is either being processed (i.e., it is cidx), or buffered in Cbuf .
Upon appending a new cluster to pipre, we calculate the maximum number of inversions incurred
by any operation in pipre so far, and this currently maximum number is recorded in inv. Note that
during the search, the value of inv never decreases.
Figure 1: Configurations in the search for the certificate.
Summarizing all important information recorded in the search for the certificate, we define the
intermediate state of the search a configuration:
Definition 4 (Configuration). The configuration is a quadruple (idx, Cbuf , pipre, inv), describing
an intermediate state during the search for the certificate.
4.2 The configuration graph
We organize all the configurations in the Configuration Graph (CG), as shown in Fig. 2. First note
that, one node in the CG does not correspond to one configuration. We group all configurations
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with the same values of idx and Cbuf (and different values of pipre and inv) together. A node in
CG is defined to represent each group of configurations.
For the ease of understanding, all nodes with the same idx values (and different Cbuf ) are put
on the same level in CG. Moreover, two special nodes require further explanations. The search for
a certificate always starts from the initial node vini = (1, ∅). The successful search always ends at
the final node vfinal = (nw + 1, ∅). Note that in Fig. 2, the special node vfinal is intentionally
drawn in a separate line.
Figure 2: Configuration graph.
Though one node in CG may correspond to different configurations during the search, the path
from vini to some node v uniquely decides one configuration. To explain this, we first define edges
between nodes. Given a node v = (idx, Cbuf ), we can process a new cluster by moving the index
pointer idx one step rightward (i.e., idx is increased dy 1). The newly covered cluster cidx+1 can
either be appended to pipre or buffered. Meanwhile, we can also stop processing new clusters, but
choose some cluster from Cbuf and append it to pipre. We denote the three types of processing
above by three types of edges stemming from v:
• Left Edge: The left child is vl = (idx + 1, Cbuf ). This means that cluster cidx has been
decided and is appended to pipre. Thus the idx is increased by 1 and the buffer of clusters is
not changed.
• Right Edge: The right child is vr = (idx + 1, Cbuf ∪ {cidx}). This means that a new cluster
is scanned and directly buffered for later processing. The pipre is unchanged.
• Horizontal Edge: The node may have multiple siblings. The sibling vh = (idx, Cbuf\ {c}) has
exactly one cluster c taken out from Cbuf and appended to pipre.
The way edges are drawn corresponds to their names. Also note that, horizon edges pointing to
vfinal is intentionally drawn downward, due to the special position of vfinal.
First observe that the initial CG node vini = (1, ∅) corresponds to exactly one configuration
(1, ∅, , 0) 3. Given explanations of all types of transitions, it is obvious to verify that the path from
3Here  denotes the empty string. The permutation pipre is considered a string of sorted clusters.
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vini to v uniquely defines one configuration. For example, consider path p1 = (1, ∅) → (2, ∅) →
(3, ∅), and path p2 = (1, ∅) → (2, [1]) → (3, [1]) → (3, ∅). Let F (p1) denote the configuration
decided by path p1. We can see that though the two paths end at the same CG node, the prefix
F (p1).pipre = 〈1, 2〉, while F (p2).pipre = 〈2, 1〉 4.
4.3 Traversal and pruning
It is straightforward to conduct a depth-first search on the CG for the certificate. When we arrive
at a node along some path, if one cluster is appended to pipre, the cost inv is updated. Whenever we
find inv > i, the node will be decided illegal, and removed from the CG. Obviously, the brute-force
traversal of the CG requires exponential time.
The key to improvements on the search cost is the pruning of CG, leveraging assumptions which
are reasonable in real scenarios. Specifically, we assume that:
Definition 5 (Bounded i). We assume that the parameter i in i-atomicity is part of the input,
but its value has a predetermined bound.
Definition 6 (Bounded w). Let w denote the number of concurrent writes in the history. We
assume that w has a predetermined bound.
Though the parameter i in the i-atomicity model can be any large integer, we usually are not
concerned of too large i values. When there are too many inversions, the quality of the distributed
storage service probably has been unacceptable and the quantification is no longer necessary. When
we conduct measurement of data consistency, we actually (implicitly) assume that, the data is not
too inconsistent. This justifies our assumption on the bound of i. Similar phenomenon has also
been observed for the k-atomicity model. When using Cassandra to provide eventually consistent
storage service and measure data consistency for the history, the actual inconsistency measured
by k is bounded [15]. Also, many eventually consistent distributed storage services emphasizing
high availability and low latency are tuned for read-dominant workloads. The write operations
are expensive and are expected to be much less frequent than read. Thus, the concurrency among
writes in such workloads is also expected to be bounded.
Given the assumptions above, basic idea of the pruning is that the buffer cannot grow arbitrarily.
If too many clusters are buffered, only a bounded part of the buffered clusters are concurrent
(bounded w). The other clusters are out of order and can cause too many inversions (exceeding
the bound i). Thus, CG nodes with oversized buffers are illegal and pruned without processing.
This intuition is captured by the following two lemmas:
Lemma 1 (Bounded buffer sizes). The buffer size of any configuration is bounded by:
0 ≤ |Cbuf | ≤ i+ w
Proof : For any configuration with buffer size i + w, we prove that the newly covered cluster
“should not” be added to the buffer. Let configuration F = (idx, Cbuf , pipre, inv). Assume that
|Cbuf | = i + w. Also assume for contradiction that F transforms to F ′ by a Right Edge, i.e., the
cluster being processed is added to the buffer. Thus, F ′ = (idx+ 1, Cbuf ∪ {cidx} , pipre, inv).
We can show that if cidx is appended to pipre before any cluster in Cbuf , at least i+ 1 inversions
will be incurred. To see this, first observe that there are at most w− 1 write operations in clusters
in Cbuf which are concurrent with the write of cidx. Thus there are at least (i+w)− (w−1) = i+1
4For the ease of presentation, we use the index value j to denote the cluster cj when no ambiguity is incurred.
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writes, which are not concurrent with the write of cidx. Since the clusters are sorted by the start
time of the dictating writes, and scanned one by one according to this order, the i+ 1 writes which
are not concurrent with the write of cidx must precede it. Appending cidx to pipre first will incur at
least i+ 1 inversions.
Thus, if we want to finally reach vfinal, we must append at least one cluster in Cbuf to pipre
before adding cidx to Cbuf . Thus configuration F
′ will never be reached for the traversal from vini
to vfinal. It can be safely pruned. 
We further find that even the buffer size is legal (no more than i + w), the index values of
buffered clusters can only appear in a limited range of integers:
Lemma 2 (Bounded buffer indexes). For configuration F = (idx, Cbuf , pipre, inv), the indexes of
clusters in Cbuf can only have values in the given range:
Cbuf ⊆ {cx|idx− 2i− 2w + 1 ≤ x < idx}
Proof : It is obvious that x < idx. What we need to show is that the “oldest” cluster which can
be in the buffer is cidx−2i−2w+1. Assume for contradiction that cluster cold = cidx−2i−2w is also in
the buffer.
Note that the current cluster being processed is cidx. Consider all clusters whose index values
range from idx − 2i − 2w to idx − 1, as shown in Fig. 3. All these clusters have been appended
to pipre or have been put into the buffer. Denote by C1 all the BLACK clusters which have been
appended to pipre, and by C2 all the GRAY clusters which are in the buffer, excluding cold. It is
obvious that |C1|+ |C2| = 2i+ 2w − 1, and C1 ∩ C2 = ∅.
We first show that |C2| ≤ i + w − 1. This is because, any buffer size is bounded by i + w,
according to Lemma 1. Since cold is also (assumed to be) in the buffer, but it is not included in C2
by definition, the size of C2 is bounded by i+ w − 1.
Based on the bound on C2 size, we have that |C1| ≥ i + w. Consider all clusters in C1 and
cluster cold, we can find more than i inversions incurred. This is because, at most w − 1 writes of
clusters in C1 are concurrent with the write of cold. Thus, there are at least i+1 remaining clusters
in C1 which have been appended to pipre before cold. Note that cold is still in the buffer. When cold
is appended to pipre some time later, the clusters in C1 will make cold incur at least i+ 1 inversions,
which makes the configuration F illegal. Thus, we have that for any (legal) configuration, the buffer
index can only have values in the given range. 
Figure 3: Indexes of clusters in the buffer.
The bound on buffer sizes and index values help us to bound the size of CG:
Lemma 3. The CG has no more than (nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1 nodes, and no more than
(i+ w + 1)(nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1 edges.
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Proof : The CG has nw+1 levels. On each level, the number of nodes are decided by the number of
different Cbuf , which is bounded by the number of all subsets of the set of permitted index values in
the buffer. According to Lemma 2, the number of possible index values is bounded by 2i+ 2w− 1.
Thus, there are at most 22i+2w−1 different buffers on one level of the CG 5. Thus, the number of
nodes in CG is bounded by (nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1.
For each node, there are at most 1 left edge and 1 right edge. The horizontal edge points to
configurations with one cluster missing in the buffer. The buffer size is i+w. Thus there are at most
i+w horizontal edges. The number of edges stemming from one nde is bounded by i+w+ 2. The
bound can be slightly improved to i+w+1. If the buffer size is i+w, this node cannot have the right
edge. This corresponds to the case where the buffer is full (as required by Lemma 1) and cannot
accept any more clusters. Thus, the number of edges is bounded by (i+w+ 1)(nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1. 
Theorem 1. The cost for solving i-AV is O(nnw(i+ w + 1)(nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1 + n2) = O(n3).
Proof : The cost for solving i-AV is based on the traversal of CG. When processing each node and
edge, we need to calculate the maximum number of inversions incurred by any operation so far. To
calculate this maximum number, we can pre-process the history σ to obtain a table which records
the maximum number of inversions that will be incurred when put an operation before and after a
given cluster. This pre-processing can be done in O(n2) time. Given the pre-processing, the update
of the maximum number of inversions during the CG traversal can be done in O(nnw) time.
In summary, the cost for solving i-AV is O(nnw(i+w+ 1)(nw + 1)2
2i+2w−1 + n2). This cost is
O(nn2w + n
2) = O(n3), when i and w are bounded. 
5 Conclusion and future work
In this work, we study the problem of measuring data consistency for eventually consistent dis-
tributed storage systems. An inversion-based metric - i-atomicity - and a polynomial verification
algorithm for a restricted type of histories are proposed. Our current progresses give rise to a num-
ber of important issues to be addressed, concerning the i-atomicity model and the i-AV problem,
as detailed below.
Variations in defining i-atomicity. Given the basic idea of using inversions to measure data
consistency, there are different ways to count the number of inversions. In our model, we use the
Imax(pi) function, which calculates the maximum number of inversion incurred by one operation.
The Imax(pi) function principally means that any single operation cannot cause too much disorder.
Another function which is also intuitively reasonable is the Isum(pi) function:
Isum(pi) =
∑
1≤i<j≤n
Bpi(i, j)
The Isum(pi) function calculates all the inversions incurred in the permutation. It basically means
that, the cumulated degree of disorder cannot exceed the user-specified bound. Though both
functions are intuitive, our verification algorithm based on the CG traversal cannot be easily applied
to the Isum(pi) case. The key challenge is that, when we reach the same CG node from a different
path, we may lower the number of inversions (calculated by Isum) incurred. This reduction in
the number of inversions may requires us to re-check CG nodes which had been determined illegal
since the number of inversions goes beyond the user-specified bound. More powerful techniques are
required to prune the CG for the Isum(pi) function.
5Note that, since the buffer size is no more than i+w, this bound can be approximately improved to its half, i.e.
1
2
22i+2w−1.
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Handling of multiple shared objects. Existing verification algorithms for the AV and k-AV
problems are designed for histories with only one shared object. However, both atomicity and
k-atomicity are local, i.e., for a history with multiple shared objects, it is atomic/k-atomic if and
only if for each object accessed, the sub-history is atomic/k-atomic [13]. The locality of atomicity
and k-atomicity makes the assumption of single shared object non-restrictive. Unfortunately, the
i-atomicity model is not local (which can be easily proved using a counter-example). When the
history contains multiple shared objects, our verification algorithm can still conduct the search, but
the pruning cannot work. Better techniques are necessary to obtain (pseudo-)polynomial algorithms
for the multiple shared object case.
Optimization by segmentation. The efficiency of our current verification algorithm may be
improved by the notion of forward/backward zones [9]. The basic idea is that using the notion
of zones, temporally unrelated parts in the history can be segmented into multiple subhistories.
This optimization may not improve the asymptotic growth rate of the verification algorithm, but
the improvements in efficiency may be important for practical use of the i-atomicity model for
consistency measurement.
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